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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a two period overlapping generation model on the effects
of child nutrition in developing countries.The model gives rise to multiple equilibria
including a poverty trap. We show that child nutrition status affects unfavorably
the evolution of human capital and leads countries into poverty. We consider differ-
ent exogenous foreign aid policies implemented by international organizations such as
the World Food Program (WFP). We find that school feeding programs solve social
problems like child labor.However, they do not necessarily lead countries to achieve
economic development. On the contrary they can lead to poverty if the initial human
capital is low. We show that if subsidies are high enough they can prevent a country
from going into poverty. Also, we argue that if the WFP provides fixed amount of
food to households, then a quality-quantity trade off takes place. Parents decrease the
nutrition of their offsprings and increase their number of children.Consequently, total
nutrition decreases and the developing country is trickles down and gets locked into
poverty trap for any given level of human capital.
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Keywords: Child Nutrition; Foreign Aids; poverty traps; human capital;school meals.
∗IRES, Universite Catholique de Louvain.E-mail: Chrysovalantis.vasilakis@uclouvain.be
1
1 Introduction
Malnutrition constitutes a global "silent emergency," killing millions every year and sapping
the long-term economic vitality of nations, says the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). In the
state of the World’s Children 1998, UNICEF adviced governments and other international
organizations to take measures against hunger and the violation of children’s rights. The
World food Program (WFP) estimates that there are about 925 millions undernourished
people in the world today.Hunger and malnutrition are the greatest risk to worldwide health
than AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, combined. Consequently, hunger and malnutrition are
top global priority.
About 90 million people per year get food from WFP the largest humanitarian organiza-
tion worldwide.According to Food Agriculture Organization (FAO),in 2004, WFP delivered
almost 50% of global food aid. WFP’s mission is to improve the nutrition and quality of
life of the most vulnerable people at critical times in their lives and to fight micronutrient
deficiencies, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, and combat disease, includ-
ing HIV and AIDS.For instance,in 2009,WFP spent 6.7 million dollars supporting regions
such as Uganda, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and Guinea, offering school feed-
ing programs, subsidizing nutrition prices, providing financial support to local farmers and
providing food to households.
This paper explores the causal link nutrition, education and human capital accumulation.
It evaluates the efficiency of different WFP food aid programs aimed at improving child
nutrition and pushing the developing countries away from deprivation. Several studies like
Arcand (2001), Wang et al (2003) and recently Curais et al (2010) show that nutrition
affects the health and economic development of nations. In particular, they argue that
low nutrition leads developing countries to impoverishment, but do not show how they can
escape from the poverty trap. Also, Galor and Mayers (2003) explain that the link between
health and education contributes to explain the long term effects of nutrition and health
on economic growth. The authors show that if policies financing education is implemented
without addressing deficiencies in nutrition, poverty traps may persist.
In our benchmark model, we consider an overlapping generation model where agents live
for two periods. Agents get the utility from the consumption and the human capital of
their surviving children. Also, agents choose how many children to have, their amount of
schooling and their level of nutrition. It is assumed that parents decide how their children
allocate their time between schooling and labor. Child labor, in fact may be crucial to
their nutrition, since many children in developing countries are forced to work to provide a
supplement to their parents income, see for example (Hazan and Berugo, 2000; Adbus and
Rangazas, 2010; Curais et al., 2010 and Moav, 2005).
In our model, if children dedicate less time to education in favor of labor, then the human
accumulation of children will have negative impact on future human capital and thus on the
income of the country. In this framework, we assume that there is no bargaining between
parents and children regarding the allocation of the family’s income (see for instance Udry,
2003). Moreover, a key ingredient of our setting is that the children’s survival probability
depends on their nutrition status (like Strulik et al, 2010; Gloom and Palumo,1999). This
allows us to investigate the effects of health in human capital through the mortality changes
( see Chakraborty and Das,2005) not only in the benchmarck model but also in the extension
of model where we also include the aid in the survival probability of children (see Huff and
Jimenez, 2003).
Our model underlines the importance of the relationship between health and learning ca-
pacity (Curais et al, 2010).Here, Nutrition has dynamic and synergistic effects on economic
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growth, through the channel of education. For instance, Neumann, Murphy et al (2007) ap-
ply a randomized school feeding study that was conducted in rural Embu District in Kenya
to test for a causal link between animal-source food intake and changes in micronutrient
nutrition and growth, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes. They show that meat supple-
mentation improves growth, cognitive and behavioral outcomes in children.Simeon (1998)
shows that providing school meals can be beneficial for learning because it relieves imme-
diate short-term hunger. Hence, children who are not hungry are more attentive and have
higher cognitive abilities.
To capture this complementarity, we consider that our law of motion of human capital
includes education, parental human capital (see de la Croix and Doepke ,2003) and nutrition
status of the children (see Curais et al,2010). Our benchmark model gives arise multiple
equilibria(development regimes) and initial conditions matter. Some coutries might caught
in a poverty trap. Possible strategies/foreign food aid will be identified and evaluated if
they allow the developing countries to escape from poverty.
Recently a number of studies focus on the relationship between foreign aid and economic
growth. Empirical studies,such as Hansen and Tarp (2001), Economides et al (2008) find
that aggregate foreign aid has on average positive growth effects on a country. However, they
do not focus on specific policies such as food assistance. Other studies (see, for instance,
Easterly et al, 2004; Roodman, 2007) argue that the recipient country’s characteristics
determine the resulting failure or success of foreign aid. Of these, the most substantial are
the timing of distributing aid during a negative trade shock (Collier and Dehn, 2001) and
the geographic/tropical location of the recipient nation (Daalgard et al, 2004).
Our paper is closely related to Azarnert (2008) and Neanidis (2010). Azarnert (2008)
explores the influence of humanitarian aid on population growth and human capital accu-
mulation.In his model, the fertility decisions are based on a quantity-quality trade off for
children, which dates to Becker (1960).This trade-off arises because the utility of parents
depends on both the number of their children and their quality. He shows that for every
adult and child aids increase fertility by reducing the quantity cost of having children. As a
result, parents invest less to the education of their offspring,which leads to the reduction of
human capital.Thus, Azarnert (2008) ignores the potentially beneficial impact of foreign aid
in the survival probability of children as documented by a number of studies (see Huff and
Jimenez, 2003 ; Neanidis, 2010). His contribution also neglects the effect of aid on children’s
health status through nutrition (see Kraak et al 1999).
Unlike Azarnert (2008), Neanidis (2010) examines the influences of foreign aid on pop-
ulation growth and health capital using a two period OLG model. He assumes that aid
is allocated to every child and adult. His model accounts for endogeneity of parents’ time
allocation to childrearing activities and in this way allows to internalize the impact of their
decisions. He finds that the per child aid( flows of medication) increases the child’s survival
probability thereby reducing fertility, while it contributes to child’s health status. On the
other hand, per adult aid increases fertility by reducing the quantity cost of children, thereby
reducing the time that parents spend to rear their children. In addition, he neglects that the
survival probability of children should also depend on health expenditures spent by parents
(see Boucekkine and Laffargue, 2010; Chakraborty and Das, 2005) because he considers that
it depends only on the foreign aid. He also ignores the complementarity that exists between
health, education and human capital accumulation as documented in a number of studies
(see Galor and Mayers, 2003 ; Curais et al, 2010). This complementarity is crucial because
there are foreign aids like school feeding programs which have as goal not only to increase
the nutrition status of children, but also to attract them on school and to diminish the child
labor.
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In contrast to the above studies, the quantity- quality tradeoff in our framework depends
on fertility and the parental expenditures for nutrition of their children and also on time
that parents allow to children to spend at school. Moreover, we evaluate the foreign food
aids for different levels of initial human capitals. Accounting for these considerations in our
model allows us to analyze a more complex effect of foreign food aid.
Next, we extend our model by implementing four different foreign aid policies provided
mainly by the WFP. Total nutrition is constituted by the foreign aid and the nutrition
offered from parents. WFP provides school meals or fixed amount of food in households,
subsidizes prices and improves the infrastructure of local food industries of developing coun-
tries. We obtain the following important results. School meals and fixed amount of nutrition
in households lock the poor developing countries in poverty. In particular, these foreign aid
programs increase the fertility by reducing the quantity cost of children. As an outcome par-
ents invest less for the nutrition of their children, leading to a slowndown the human capital
accumulation which may even lock the recipient economy into a poverty trap. Nevertheless,
if WFP decides to provide high amounts of food in schools or in households, then the total
child nutrition depends only on the foreign aid programs. Thus, the developing country can
escape from the poverty trap. When the WFP subsidize the prices of child nutrition there
is an income effect, even further parents can afford to offer more nutrition resources. The
total nutrition rises thereby increasing the survival probability of children and their human
capital.As a result, poor countries can escape from the poverty trap.
Additionally, school feeding programs are more efficient for the middle-income developing
countries than the other two foreign aid programs. They increase the length of schooling and
improve human capital of future generations even if the total nutrition remains unchanged
(Jacoby et al,1996; Powell et al,1983; Murphy et al,2003 and Agarwai et al,1989). Child labor
decreases. Consequently, middle-income countries can achieve their economic development.
Finally, we consider that WFP improves the infrastructure of local food industries or
supports financially the local farmers such that to increase the quality of food and to im-
prove the agricultural productivity. This improvement is captured in our framework by the
technological level of our law of motion of human capital. Consequently, an increase in
the technological level raises the human capital of future generations and hence the poor
economies can achieve the economic development.
At the end of this paper, we calibrate our model. Following the technique of Bils and
Klenow (2000), we obtain the human capital stock by using surveys which are compiled by
the United Nations and reported in the two UNESCO publications Statistics of Educational
Attainment and illiteracy 1945-1974 and Statistics of Educational and illiteracy 1970-1980
and PennWord tables for 66 developing countries (almost half of them are African countries).
Also, using data from Barro and Lee data base, World bank data and nutrition data from
Food Agriculture Organization (FAO), we estimate the parameters of our human capital
accumulation. We find that all the variables that consist the law motion of human capital
(nutrition, education and parental human capital) are significant. The rest of parameters
are based on the existent literature.
We decide to provide a numerical example of our model for the following reasons. First
of all, we know that the majority of developing countries are rural economies. In our
model, we consider a linear production function such that we can obtain analytical results.
In the calibration part, we investigate the linear production function as in the theoretical
part and the decreasing returns to scales production function that characterizes the rural
economies.We find that our results remain the same in both cases.
Moreover, we provide this numerical example to investigate what the level of assistance
from WFP that can lead the countries out of the poverty for each foreign aid policy. Finally,
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we provide a sensitivity analysis of our parameters to ensure the validity of our results which
is confirmed.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model,
section 3 illustrates the dynamics of human capital, section 4 presents the different for-
eign aid programs incorporated the benchmark model, Section 5 illustrates a computational
Experiment and section 6 concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model
Fertility, mortality and net reproduction. Consider an OLG economy in which ac-
tivity extends over an infinite horizon. In each generation, individuals live for two periods:
childhood and adulthood. All the decisions are taken by adults. Let Lt denote the number
of adults in period t, and nt the number of births per adult. The probability of survival
from childhood to adulthood is denoted by pit ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, it is synonymous to the
fraction of children, born in period t and become adult in period t+1. We assume that the
children live all the period t.At the end of the period t, children either die or become adults
in period t+1. It follows that the net reproduction rate is pitnt. Thus, the adult population
at period t+ 1 is:
Lt+1 = pitntLt. (1)
Also, we assume that the survival probability is endogenous and it is a function of
the total level of nutrition.In particular, we assume that pit = pi(Mt), where pi
′
(Mt) > 0
and pi
′′
(Mt) < 0. This is in line with Fogel(1994) who has shown that better nutrition
in childhood affects the health and life span during the adult years of life.Moreover, we
are consistent with Gloom and Palumo(1993) who analyze a life cycle model where the
survival probability is determined by health capital via nutritional investment. The survival
probability of children is expressed by the function:
pit = min[M
σ
t , 1]. (2)
with 0 < σ < 1. The specification of survival probability is similar to Chakraborty and
Das (2005) and Boucekkine and Laffargue (2010).
Preferences and optimization. Adults maximize utility which they derive from their
consumption ct, the number ,nt and the human capital of their children ht+1 and the chil-
dren’s survival probability,pit. The utility function is given by :
ln ct + β ln(pitntht+1). (3)
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The parameter β > 0 is the altruism factor. Notice that the parents care about the quantity
nt and the quality ht+1 of their surviving children. This type of preferences specification has
been used in the literature on fertility and growth(see for instance, Galor and Weil, 2000;
Hazan and Berdugo, 2002; Moav,2005).
The adults are endowed with one unit of time.Raising one child takes the fraction φ ∈
(0, 1)of an adult’s time. The income of an adult is wtht where wt is the wage per human
capital and ht is adult’s human capital. Consequently, as it is standard in the literature
(see for instance Barro and Becker,1989 ; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003; Azarnet, 2008) the
existence of the opportunity cost wthtφnt creates a trade off between the quality and the
quantity of children.
Furthermore, an adult has to choose a consumption profile ct, the number children nt,
nutrition of the children mt and the number of years of schooling per child et.Here, we
consider that the amount of schooling, et is the time that the child spends after primary
school which is usually compulsory. Hence, q represents the minimum education received in
primary school in developing countries. We shall assume that q ! q¯ > 0,otherwise human
capital would be zero in the low regime. This parameter ensures that human capital is
positive. The latter reason is the basis of many papers ( see de la Croix and Doepke ,2003
; Hazan and Berdugo ,2002) of using this parameter. On the contrary, Curais et al (2010)
consider q as infancy in their human capital accumulation.
Hence, the human capital of children ht+1 depends on the education level et and total
nutrition Mt. In the benchmark model total nutrition coincides with the nutrition offered
by parents, mt. The human capital accumulation is the following :
ht+1 = BM
θ1
t (et + q)
θ2h1−θ1−θ2t . (4)
Also, we assume that the law motion of human capital depends on the human capital of
the parents ht and B which is the productivity of human capital(technological level).This
law of motion is different than than the law motion of human capital accumulation used by
Curais et al(2010). We suppose that B is constant. More precise it is equal to one and it
can be influenced exogenously. Here, in the law motion of human capital, the ht captures
the intergenerational transmission of human capital within a family. In other words young
individuals inherits part of the human capital of the parents. This reflects the cultural
transmission within the family. Our human capital accumulation differs from that of de la
Croix and Doepke(2003) since it contains the nutrition and we also assume that q is primary
education.
Children also contribute to family income. Children have an endowment of 1 unit of
time. This time is spent either learning et or working (1 − et − q).The earning of a child
who is capable to work is wtγ(1 − et − q). The child worker lacks experience and physical
strength comparing to adult worker. Thus, we consider that 0 < γ < 1.
Moreover, since we have homogenous agents in one sector model,we assume that all chil-
dren have the same productivity and their human capital do not influence it. Furthermore,
the parents spend the household revenue for their consumption and the nutrition of their
children. Thus, the budget constraint has the following form :
ct +mtnt = wtht(1− φnt) + wtγ(1− et − q)nt. (5)
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Firms. Firms produce using a constant returns to scale technology:
Yt = Ht, (6)
whereHt is the total amount of human capital in the workforce. We make this assumption to
obtain analytical results although we know that constant returns to scale are not consistent in
rural economies. Nevertheless, the same assumption is done by Adbus and Rangazas (2010)
who investigate the effects of food consumption in economic growth in the development of
England during the mid-18 century. The main reason that we also use linear production
function is to obtain analytical results and simplicity1. At the labor market’s equilibrium,
Ht is:
Ht = [1− φnt]ht + γ[1− et − q]nt. (7)
The workforce participation of a parent consists of his remaining time after childbearing
and educating his children and therefore of the time that a child works. As the labor market
is competitive, the wage equals to the children’s marginal productivity at each date t is
constant and normalized to wt = 1 for simplicity.
At this point of our analysis, we impose two assumptions.Assumption 1 ensures the
positivity of human capital in the steady state. Hazan and Berdugo (2002) and Curais et al
(2010) have a similar condition.2
Assumption 1. h0 > γφ .
Next assumption ensures the positivity of our optimal choices.
Assumption 2. 1− θ1 − θ2 − σ > 0.
Optimal Choices. Maximizing equation 3 subject to equations 4-5 the optimal solutions
for education, nutrition and fertility are:
et =

0 ht ≤ h1,
θ2[htφ−γ]
γ(1−θ1−θ2−σ) − q h1 < ht < h2,
1− q ht ≥ h2.
(8)
1In our numerical example we also present a decreasing returns to scale production function Y = Hαt
that it is consistent with agriculture economies
2They consider that the income generated by children is accrued to parents and the time of rearing a
child is intensive. As a result the increasing differential wage( between parental and child labour) leads to
a decrease of child labour. Moreover, the initial human capital should be large enough.
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The threshold levels of adult human capital3 h1 = (q(1−θ1−θ2−σ)+θ2)γθ2φ and h2 =
γ(1−θ1−σ)
φθ2
define three distinct situations. In the low regime, children attend only primary school and
they dedicate the rest of their childhood to increase the family income. Time dedicated to
education begins to be positive and increasing with parents’ income when human capital is
. In the high regime, children dedicate the whole unit of time to education. In other words,
there is no child labor in the high regime.
The nutrition level offered from parents coincides with the total nutrition that children
received:
mt = Mt =

(σ+θ1)(htφ−γ(1−q)
1−σ−θ1 ht ≤ h1,
(σ+θ1)(htφ−γ)
1−σ−θ1−θ2 h1 < ht < h2,
(σ+θ1)(htφ)
1−σ−θ1 ht ≥ h2.
(9)
The optimal nutrition above is consistent with Arcand ( 2001) and Wang et al ( 2003).
As already mentioned, these studies show that low income levels related to low nutrition
levels (see Appendix A and figure 1). Hence, the optimal nutrition choice is an increasing
function of human capital. They used pairs of GDP and information and average daily per
capita calorie intake in a sample of 114 countries and they show that countries with higher
GDP have higher level of nutrition. It is important to mention that when the maximum
level of nutrition is achieved the number of children per adult decreases4.
nt =

(1−σ−θ1)htβ
(1+β)(htφ−γ(1−q)) ht ≤ h1,
βht(1−θ1−θ2−σ)
(1+β)(htφ−γ) h1 < ht < h2,
(1−σ−θ1)β
(1+β)φ ht ≥ h2.
(10)
3We can also be considered as income because we have linear production function.
4In the Appendix A, we provide an analysis where we compare the nutrition levels in the different human
capital levels.Moreover, we investigate the optimal solutions of fertility as the ht increases. We show that
the nutrition level increases and the fertility decreases as human capital raises. The latter can be observed
in figure 1.
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Figure 1: Nutrition and Fertility in Benchmark model
Fertility is positive and decreasing with parental human capital (see Appendix A and
figure 1). This mechanism dates to Becker (1960) where fertility decisions are based on
a quantity-quality tradeoff for children. This trade off arises because the utility parents
depends on both of the number of their survived children and their quality captured by their
level of human capital. Given that the human accumulation arises through investments in
education and nutrition a trade off emerges since education and nutrition are costly. Thus,
as human capital increases through nutrition and education, fertility declines. In other
words, parents choose child quality over child quantity. This is consistent with the empirical
evidence that shows that the fertility rate is lower in developed countries (for instance see
Galor and Weil, 2000; Chakraborty, 2004; Azarnet, 2006; Moav; 2005) and it becomes
constant.
3 Evolution of human capital
Using the optimal decisions on education, total nutrition and fertility, we obtain the following
picture for human capital accumulation:
ht+1 =

(σ+θ1)
θ1 (htφ−γ(1−q))θ1h1−θ1−θ2t qθ2
(1−θ1−σ)θ1 ht ≤ h1,
(σ+θ1)
θ1 (htφ−γ)θ1+θ2h1−θ1−θ2t θθ22
(1−θ1−σ−θ2)θ1+θ2γθ2 h1 ≤ ht ≤ h2,
(σ+θ1)
θ1 (htφ)
θ1h
1−θ1−θ2
t
(1−θ1−σ)θ1 ht ≥ h2.
(11)
We need further assumptions to ensure that children should perceive a minimum human
capital equal or above their parents (Assumption 3) and to bound q (Assumption 4).
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Assumption 3
limht→ γφht+1 ≥
γ
φ
. (12)
Assumption 4.
The q value lies on the following interval, q ∈ (q¯, qmax], where
qmax =
θ
θ2
θ1+θ2
2 (σ + θ1)
θ1
θ1+θ2 φθ2
θ
θ2
θ1+θ2
2 ((σ + θ1)
θ1
θ1+θ2 φ− (1− θ1 − θ2 − σ)γ
θ2
θ1+θ2 )(1− θ1 − θ2 − σ)
.
This assumption defines a low and upper bound for q. We can see in figure 2 the existence
of 3 steady states, one in each regime.Depending on the parameter values, the highest steady
state could be below or above h25.
Figure 2: Human capital
We show that when the level of human capital is below h2, the economy converges to
low nutrition , high fertility and low human capital equilibrium hss1 which is locally stable
5In the Appendix, we present the three steady states
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(see Figure 2). This steady state is a poverty trap because it is an asymptotic destination
of any economy whose initial human capital stock is in interval (γφ ,hss2). We understand a
poverty trap as "any self reinforcing mechanism which causes poverty to persist" (Azariadis
and Stachurski, 2005).
The following proposition proves that there exists two additional steady states, one
unstable equilibrium and one stable. As a result, the economy either falls in poverty or
achieves in economic development.
Proposition 1.
1. Under assumptions 1-4 and hss3 < h2, there exists a unique locally steady state, hss1
and an unstable steady state, hss2. Hence, if economy’s initial human capital stock be-
longs to interval ( γφ ,hss2) then it falls into a poverty trap, i.e. human capital converges
to hss1 .
2. If hss3 > h2 and hss2 ∈ [h1, h2], then there are two locally stable steady states and one
unstable.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 1 argues that the existence of two or three steady states depends on the
initial human capital of the country. Two of them are locally stable and one unstable. If the
initial level of human capital is greater than the threshold h2 the whole economy converges
to the low fertility, high nutrition and high human capital equilibrium hss3 which is locally
stable. On the other hand if the initial human capital is in hss3 < h2 then the total economy
converges to the low nutrition, high fertility and low levels of human capital which is in fact
the poverty trap (see Figure 2).
There are several international organizations like World Food Program (WFP), Food
Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNESCO that provide food aid to developing countries
not only to relief the short term hunger but also to lead them out of poverty. In the next
sections, we evaluate the different foreign aid policies that applied from WFP.
4 Food Foreign Aids
In this section, we try to implement different ways to escape from the poverty trap and to
lead the countries to economic development. There are different opportunities to escape
from poverty trap. In particular, it can be variations in the initial conditions of the system
by different foreign aids or a parallel shift-up of the transition function ht+1. More precisely,
we examine the different aids provided by the WFP and we investigate if they can be efficient
for the countries to escape from the poverty trap. Are all the different aid programs offered
by WFP really efficient ? This question will be answered in this section.
WFP provides food to development countries. One of its main activities is procurement
by buying food for households, feeding programs in school, enhancing financial local farmers
and in general local economies and offering emergency aid to difficult situations. In the
following subsection, we introduce feeding programs in school, in subsection 2, we consider
that WFP subsidizes the prices for child nutrition and as a result to decrease its price.
In subsection 3, WFP offers a fixed amount of nutrition in households and in subsection
4, WFP supports financially the local farmers and the local food industries such that to
improve the quality of the nutrition and the infrastructure of the developing country.
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4.1 Feeding programmes in school
WFP’s school meal programmes work towards achieving several Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs)6. The programmes directly address the goals of reducing hunger by half,
achieving universal primary education and of achieving gender parity in education – all by
2015. In particular, WFP has become the largest organiser of school feeding programmes
in the developing world. In 2003, WFP fed more than 15 million children in schools in 69
countries. Working with national governments, local authorities, donors and international
and local aid groups, WFP uses food to attract children to school and to keep them on it.
The WFP transfers available resources to children at each period t in order to improve
the human capital according to the following rule. A fixed quantity of nutrition commodity
T per unit of time dedicated to education and it is transfered per child.
Now the survival probability is the following:
pit = (mt + T (et + q)))
σ (13)
where T (et+q) stands for the meals offered per child during the time it spends in school.The
motion of human capital is given now by
ht+1 = (mt + T (et + q))
θ1(et + q)
θ2h1−θ1−θ2t . (14)
Now, the survival probability and human capital accumulation depends on the nutrition
offered from parents and the foreign aid which is the school meals. The total nutrition
isMt = mt + T (et + q).
Maximizing the welfare of equation (3) subject to equations (5) and (14) the following
optimal solutions for education, nutrition and fertility are obtained:
et =

0 ht ≤ h1(T ),
θ2[htφ−γ]
(γ−T )(1−θ1−θ2−σ) − q h1(T ) < ht < h2(T ),
1− q ht ≥ h2(T ),
(15)
where h1(T ) = q(1−θ1−θ2−σ)(γ−T )+θ2γθ2φ and h2(T ) =
γ(1−θ1−σ)−T (1−θ1−θ2−σ)
φθ2
are thresholds
and they depend on T .
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 2 h1 and h2 decrease whenever T increases.
Proof. See Appendix C.
6The Millennium Development Goals are to :1)Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2)achieve universal
primary education, 3) promote gender equality and empower women, 4) reduce child mortality, 5)improve
maternal health,6)combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, 7) ensure environmental sustainability, 8)
develop a global partnership for development.
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The thresold levels of human capital decrease with T . As an outcome, the policy being
considered alters the behavior with respect to fertility, nutrition and human capital invest-
ments. After introducing school feeding programs, the total optimal nutrition of children
depends on the nutrition offered from parents and the school meals. Now the optimal total
nutrition of children is the following:
Mt = mt + T (et + q) =

(σ+θ1)[htφ−γ(1−q)−Tq)
(1−σ−θ1) ht ≤ h1(T ),
(θ1+σ)
(1−θ1−θ2−σ) [htφ− γ] h1(T ) < ht < h2(T ),
(σ+θ1)[htφ−T (1+q)]
(1−σ−θ1) ht ≥ h2(T ).
(16)
As it can be observed, the total level of nutrition of children is still an increasing function
of human capital (see figure 3).Comparing with the benchmark model, the total nutrition
decreases in the low regime because of T and it remains the same in the second regime since
it is independent of T .
Figure 3: Nutrition and Fertility with school feeding programs
The nutrition offered from parents decreases and it is the following:
mt =

(σ+θ1)(hφ−γ)
1−θ1−σ +
[[σ+θ1]γ−T ]q
1−θ1−σ ht ≤ h1(T )
(θ1+σ)
(1−θ1−θ2−σ) [htφ− γ]−
Tθ2[[htφ−γ]
(γ−T )(1−θ1−θ2−σ) h1(T ) < ht < h2(T )
(σ+θ1)(htφ)−T (1+q)
1−σ−θ1 ht ≥ h2(T )
(17)
Fertility depends on the level of T . We observe that fertility increases and the nutrition
decreases comparing with those of benchmark model. The product of quality- quantity
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trade off7 is independent of the T and remains the same with that of benchmark model8.
This means that as parents increase the number of their children they will decrease the
amount of nutrition level provided to their children. Comparing to benchmark model, the
fertility is a decreasing function with respect to human capital(see figure 3).
nt =

(1−σ−θ1)htβ
(1+β)((htφ−γ(1−q))−Tq) ht ≤ h1(T ),
βht(1−θ1−θ2−σ)
(1+β)(htφ−γ) h1(T ) < ht < h2(T ),
(1−σ−θ1)βht
((1+β)(htφ)−(1+q)T ) ht ≥ h2(T ).
(18)
Equations (16) and (17) show that school feeding decreases the amount of nutrition
offered from parents to their children in all regimes.It can be observed that education has a
negative effect on total child nutrition that is offered by parents because it prevents children
to work. In particular, in poor developing countries, foreign aid policy decreases not only
the total nutrition but also the total human capital. Here, it takes place a tradeoff of the
child quantity over the child quality. In the interval ht ≤ h1(T ) ,school feeding programs
increase fertility by reducing the "quantity cost" of children, thereby shifting resources from
quality to quantity of children. In other words, parents decrease the level of nutrition of their
offsprings and they increase the number of their children.This trade off takes place as long
as the fixed commodity, T , is sufficient small (see equation 19 and equation 10). This result
is consistent with Azarnet (2008) where humanitarian aid increases fertility by reducing the
investment of parents in their children education, and subsequent of accumulation of human
capital.
Therefore, Neanidis (2010) shows similar results where the per adult aid increases the
fertility by reducing the "quantity cost" of children. This shifts resources from quality of
children to quantity of children. The main differences with his contribution are the following:
first, in our model aid does not reduce the childbearing time but the investment of parents for
the nutrition of their children and second we consider that the survival probability depends
on the nutrition offered from parents and the foreign aid.
Also, it is important to mention that since the total nutrition level decreases, the survival
probability decreases. This shows that there is inverse relation between fertility and survival
probability, which is consistent with Agenor (2009)9 The following proposition summarizes
the effect of school feeding programs on the optimal choices of parents with respect to
number and quality of their offspring.
Proposition 3. School Feeding programs generate a substitution effect away from quality
of children toward quantity of children in poor developing countries if the T is small.
Proposition 4 implies the following:
7The quantity-quality trade off is more obvious in developing countries than in developed. In a developing
country such as India, Burundi, where neither a well-functioning public education system nor generous
support the childbearing and childcare, the cost of quality is mostly borne by the parents. There is also
some evidence from developing countries in studies of public health. See for instance Karmaus and Botezan
(2002).
8Since we have logarithmic utility function, the quality-quantity trade off is a constant fraction of house-
hold income.
9Agenor (2009) refers that if the survival probability decreases there is an increase in the demand of
children.
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• Parents decrease the investment in nutrition if T is sufficient small (proof : see equation
(16)).
• Parents increase the number of their children (proof : see equation (18)).
This proposition is valid as long as the fixed commodity T is smaller than the nutrition
offered by parents. When T is higher than (σ+θ1)((1−θ1−σ)γ)(1−θ1−θ2−σ)(σ+θ1)+θ2 parents decide to stop
offering food at home and the total nutrition of children is equal to school meals10. Hence,
the human capital accumulation of children depends only on the foreign aid of WFP. If this
aid is higher than (σ+θ1)((1−θ1−σ)γ)(1−θ1−θ2−σ)(σ+θ1)+θ2 the poor country can escape from the poverty trap.
Proposition 4. For values of T higher than (σ+θ1)((1−θ1−σ)γ)(1−θ1−θ2−σ)(σ+θ1)+θ2 parents stop offering food
at home, the children’s nutrition depends on the level of nutrition of foreign aid and poor
countries can escape from the poverty trap.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Consequently, we conclude that WFP should offer high amounts of school meals if this
organization wants to attract children in school, to solve hunger and poverty. This foreign
aid has different results for middle income developing countries. More precisely, school
feeding programs increase the length of school time In this case, school feeding programs
are very effective in solving child labor in developing countries.Furthermore, they lead to
an improvement in the human capital and allow better conditions for the next generations
(see Chandler et al, 1995; Chang et al, 1996). Human capital increases only through the
channel of education, because the total nutrition remains constant. This result is confirmed
by four studies which argue that the benefit of supplements because of the school meals was
less than expected in areas like Peru ( Jacoby et al, 1996); Jamaica ( Powell et al, 1983);
Kenya ( Murphy et al,2003) and India ( Agarwai et al,1989). The authors of two of these
studies concluded that children who had been offered a substantial supplement at school
were provided with less food at home (substitution). The next proposition summarizes the
above results.
Proposition 5. School feeding programs increases the length of schooling and reduce child
labor in middle income developing countries.
Proposition 6. In middle income developing countries, School feeding programs do not
increase the total nutrition of children but increase the length of schooling.
• These two propositions imply that that the total human capital increases(Proof see
equations 16, 17 and 18).
We need to mention here, that the feeding programs in school have positive implications
that can not be captured by this model. In particular, in developing countries, school meals
can provide short term relief of hunger since in the poorest areas families can not have even
the basic food for their children. School meals can also affect children with HIV/AIDS,
orphans, disabled and former soldiers that these categories are not included in our model.
Looking at the total welfare of parents in the different regimes, we can notice that there
are ambiguous effects in the first regime and also there is improvement in the second regime.
At the end, it is noteworthy to mention that there is evidence like Bro et al(1994 and 1996)
which show that a generous breakfast cooked in a practical class before the lesson began
10The optimal choices for total nutrition and fertility change change
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improved the attention to set tasks and also their data suggested that a school meal that
can be a social event stimulates and motivates the students. This aspect is not captured by
our model.
4.2 Food provision in Households
In this part of the analysis, we assume that WFP provides two forms of aid. First, we
consider that WFP subsidizes the prices of nutrition and second, it provides a fixed amount
of nutrition to each child of household. We assume that all the households of the recipient
country receives this kind of humanitarian aid.
4.2.1 Subsidize the price of nutrition of children or procurement by WFP
Food prices in developing countries have declined since 2008 but remain much higher than
pre-food prices some years earlier. This high food price situation continues to raise concern
for the food security of populations in urban and rural areas, as these groups spend a large
share of the incomes in food(see for instance report of FAO july 2009). Consequently, WFP
tries not only to stabilize the food prices but also to reduce by subsidizing them.
In this subsection we consider that the WFP purchases food at the most advantageous
price taking into account the cost of transport and shipping, with preferences towards procur-
ing locally ore regionally in developing countries wherever possible (see for instance report
WFP about Egypt (2005)).
We assume that WFP buys and offers a percentage of nutrition of each child as voucher
or as cash to families to buy only nutrition for children, ηt in each household.We suppose
that the price of nutrition is equal to 1.Thus their offer is ηtmtnt in each household. We
suppose that this is a project of WFP offering aid continuously for years in a developing
country or it is a bilateral food aid that supplied by government to government. Later
the government provides this food to households without cost. Of course there are certain
types of food aid that can actually be destructive. Dumping food on to poor nations (i.e.
free, subsidized, or cheap food, below market prices) undercuts local farmers, who cannot
compete and are driven out of jobs and into poverty. In this analysis, we assume that WFP
subsidizes the price of the nutrition of children and we do not include these kind of aid in
our framework.Also, we mention that the nutrition that offered from parents to children is
equal to the total nutrition.
Next we maximize the young adults’ welfare that is described in equation (3) under the
budget constraint
ct + (1− ηt)mtnt = ht(1− φnt) + γ(1− et − q)nt, (19)
and the motion of human capital given by the equation (4).
The optimal choices for education, nutrition and fertility are
et =

0 ht ≤ h1,
θ2[htφ−γ]
γ(1−θ1−θ2−σ) − q h1 < ht < h2,
1− q ht ≥ h2.
(20)
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The thresholds h1 and h2 defined in the benchmark model. Also, we notice that the level
of education remains the same with the level of education before aid(see equation 8 ).
Mt = mt =

(σ+θ1)(htφ−γ(1−q))
(1−σ−θ1)(1−ηt) ht ≤ h1,
(σ+θ1)(htφ−γ))
(1−σ−θ1−θ2)(1−ηt) h1 < ht < h2
(σ+θ1)(htφ)
(1−σ−θ1)(1−ηt) ht ≥ h2.
(21)
Equation (21) argues that the nutrition of children increases in all regimes (see figure 4).
Low prices for nutrition allow parents to spend more for it than before. Thus, the total level
of nutrition increases.
nt =

(1−σ−θ1)htβ
(1+β)(htφ−γ(1−q)) ht ≤ h1,
βht(1−θ1−θ2−σ)
(1+β)(htφ−γ) h1 < ht < h2,
(1−σ−θ1)β
(1+β)φ ht ≥ h2.
(22)
Equation (22) shows that the level of fertility is not affected by the introduction of this
foreign aid.
Figure 4: Nutrition and Fertility with subsidizing food
Proposition 7. There is a level of ηt which leads out of the poverty trap. This level is :
ηt > 1− h
(−θ1−θ2)1/θ1
1 q
θ2
θ1 (σ + θ1)(h1φ− γ(1− q))
(1− σ − θ1)
.
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Proof. See in Appendix E.
As pointed out earlier, we note that the allocation of time in education remains the same
as the pre aid scenario. On other hand, we notice that there is an improvement in the
nutrition level and leading in an improvement in human capital. Like Neanidis (2010) this
kind of aid raises the probability of a child’s survival thereby reducing indirect the fertility
while at the same time it contributes to children’s health status though improving nutrition.
This has a positive effect on growth and it allows the poor developing countries to escape
from poverty trap after a certain value of aid (see proposition 8) In the meantime, we show
that children will continue to work and there is not reduction in the child labor if the aid
is not sufficient. The reduction of child labor is an indirect consequence of the increase
of human capital through nutrition. In other words, food aid program may have positive
intergenerational effects, which leads the developing countries out of poverty.
Looking the total welfare of parents we note that there is an improvement because of this
kind of aid in all the regimes. As it is mentioned before, this aid can have a negative impact
on the economy if WFP does not subsidize the prices of nutrition but buy this percentage
of food outside of the country. The main reason is that the majority of workers are farmers
and such aid can lead them to obtain lower incomes. In this framework, we assumed that
either the government or WFP buys the nutrition for the local industries. This assumption
has also an indirect income of the total economy that it does not captured by the model.
4.2.2 Food provision to households
In this subsection, we investigate the case that WFP offers a fixed amount of nutrition for
each child of households. Nice example of this aid is that in 2010, WFP provided 36.500
metric tons of food aid to assist families in Pakistan. This aid can be taken place as a small
amount of supplemental feeding in each child of a household.A supplemental feeding exists
for a certain sectors of populations which are poor and they are unaffordable to cover the
expenses for their children. But, in our model, we suppose that each household of the receipt
country receives this kind of aid.
Maximizing the utility function of young adults of equation (3) subject to the budget
constraint of equation (5) and the law motion of human capital which is now :
ht+1 = (mt + m¯)
θ1(et + q)
θ2h1−θ1−θ2t . (23)
Now the total nutrition depends on the the nutrition offered from parents and the fixed
amount of nutrition,m¯t provided from the WFP, Mt = mt + m¯.As a result, the survival
probability is pit = (mt + m¯)σ. The optimal choices are the following:
et =

0 ht ≤ h1(m¯),
θ2[htφ−γ)−(θ2)m¯
(γ(1−θ1−θ2−σ) − q h1(m¯) < ht < h2(m¯),
1− q ht ≥ h2(m¯).
(24)
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where h1(m¯) = (q(1−θ1−θ2−σ)+θ2)γ+θ2m¯θ2φ and h2(m¯) =
((1−θ1−σ)γ+θ2m¯
θ2φ
depend on m¯. The
equation (24) shows that the length of schooling decreases when this kind of aid offered in
middle income countries. The following optimal choices of nutrition and fertility show that
the total level of nutrition, nutrition offered from parents and fertility decrease with the offer
of fixed food in households.
mt =

(σ+θ1)(wthtφ−wtγ(1−q)−m¯
1−σ−θ1 ht ≤ h1(m¯)
(σ+θ1)(wthtφ−wtγ)−(1−θ2)m¯
1−σ−θ1−θ2 h1(m¯) < ht < h2(m¯)
(σ+θ1)(wthtφ)−m¯
1−σ−θ1 ht ≥ h2(m¯)
(25)
As highlighted before the total nutrition is the sum of the nutrition offered from parental
income and the fixed amount of nutrition offered from WFP. Thus, the following equation
constitutes the total nutrition level. It remains an increasing function with respect to human
capital(See Figure 5).
Mt =

(σ+θ1)(htφ−γ(1−q)−[σ+θ1]m¯
1−σ−θ1 ht ≤ h1(m¯),
(σ+θ1)(htφ−γ)−(σ+θ1)m¯
1−σ−θ1−θ2 h1(m¯) < ht < h2(m¯),
(σ+θ1)(htφ)−(σ+θ1)m¯
1−σ−θ1 ht ≥ h2(m¯).
(26)
The parents decrease the nutrition level offered to their children and they increase the
number of their children such that the product of quantity and quality trade-off remains
the same with that of benchmark model. The product of quality and quantity trade-off is
independent from the fixed amount of food.
nt =

(1−σ−θ1)htβ
(1+β)(htφ−γ(1−q))−m¯) ht ≤ h1(m¯, )
βht(1−θ1−θ2−σ)
(1+β)(htφ−γ−m¯) h1(m¯) < ht < h2(m¯),
(1−σ−θ1)βht
(1+β)(htφ−m¯) ht ≥ h2(m¯).
(27)
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Figure 5: Nutrition and Fertility with fixed food
We have proven that providing fixed amount of food do not solve the poverty of the
country. In particular, if WFP continues to offer a fixed level amount in households in
middle income developing countries, it leads them to deprivation. This kind of aid does
not only decrease the total level of nutrition of children but also it decreases the length
of schooling. Parents decide not only to reduce the investment of health of their children
through nutrition but also the time that their children spend at school. On the contrary
they increase the number of their children such that the quality-quantity trade off remains
constant and the same of benchmark model.
Thus, the following proposition summarizes the effect of school feeding programs on the
optimal choices of parents with respect to number and quality of their offspring.
Proposition 8. Fixed amount of nutrition offered from WFP in households generates a
substitution effect away from quality of children toward quantity of children in poor and
middle income developing countries if the m¯ is small.
Proposition implies the following:
• Parents decrease the investment for nutrition for their children if m¯ is sufficient small
(proof : see equations (25),(26)).
• Parents increase the total fertility(proof : see Equation (27)).
• Parents decrease the investment for nutrition for their children and also their length
of schooling in middle income developing countries (proof see equations:(24),(26) and
(27)).
This proposition implies that for smaller values of m¯ than the level of nutrition can be af-
fordable offered from parents, the countries are locked to poverty trap. When m¯ is higher
than (σ+θ1)γθ2 , then parents decide stopping pay for food and the total nutrition offered to
children is equal to fixed amount offered by the WFP11. Hence, the human capital accumu-
lation of children depends only on the foreign aid of WFP. If this aid is higher than (σ+θ1)γθ2
the poor country can escape from the poverty trap.
11When the subsistence of food of children is based only in the fixed amount of foreign aid then the optimal
choices for total nutrition and fertility change. Then the developing countries can escape from the poverty
trap temporary. if the WFP decides to reduce the amount of fixed food and parents start to offer food at
their children then the countries fall into poverty again (see second regime).We need to mention that this
aid is provided specially in cases where parents can not offer food to their children (emergencies situations,
war).
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Proposition 9. For values of m¯ higher than (σ+θ1)γθ2 parents stop buying food at home.
Therefore, the children’s nutrition depends solely on the level of nutrition of foreign aid
offered. In this case, poor countries can escape from the poverty trap.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Poor countries can escape from the poverty only if WFP offers a large amount of food to
the households. Then, like in school feeding programs, parents stop offering nutrition level
to their children and the total nutrition is consisted by the fixed amount of aid. We can
conclude that this kind of aid hurts the receipt countries and WFP should give importance
in which countries should offer this.Looking the welfare of parents, we can observe that
there are ambiguous effects in the first regime but it decreases in the second regime. It is
important to mention that this kind of aid is important even if this result was not expected.
The importance of this aid is that it can be a short term hunger relief of poor countries
countries when terrible events happen to them.
4.3 Other strategies to escape the developing countries from the
poverty trap
In this subsection, we include different foreign aid policies which we did not mention
above.The majority of foreign aid policies concern improvement in infrastructure. They
then lead to parallel shift up of the transitory function ht+1. We explain why these aids
are efficient and can lead the developing countries out from the poverty trap.In particular,
any improvement in infrastructure and quality of food increase the technological level, B,
of human capital accumulation.
There are some programs such that Food for Work and/or Training (FWT) in which
they provide food in exchange of labor in public works projects (such as development of
rural infrastructure, roads, or irrigation) which can stimulate the local economy and lay the
foundations for the development of local security capacity. FWT not only provides food
for the workers in the short run but also improves the infrastructure which has a positive
impact in communities and the country in the long run.
Also,there are national organizations which offer food in clinics and in other health
structures to combat malnutrition for the poor and unhealthy people. Kraak et al(1999)
show this kind of food aid directly benefits poor people while it improves the quality of diet
of people with HIV/AIDS. Moreover, governments, interested in improvement of nutrition
status, try to find donors that are willing to finance health programs and to contribute
the health infrastructure of their country (For instance see report of Economic and Social
Council of United Nations for Nambia,2010). The improvements in health sector have as a
target the mother and child. Thus, these exogenous interventions has as a goal not only the
reduction of infant mortality, underweight rates, and micronutrients deficiencies but also the
improvement and development of human capital and the economic growth of the country.
The WFP invests in local food industries in developing countries to enable it to find
local sources for blended and fortified foods. Thanks these investments there is an increase
in the food quality. For instance, in 2004, WFP decided that the local food processors
should conform the international standard to control quality for the entire manufacturing
process in Southern Africa. With a grant from the Government of Canada, an extensive
study was launched to provide support to WFP for this effort. Thus, WFP supported the
local processors in food sector to succeed to meet the quality standards in Southern Africa.
All the above aids can be captured in our model by B which is the technological level
or efficiency parameter of human capital. We suppose that improvements in quality of
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food (Fogel, 1994,Kraak et al, 1999) and health(Shultz,1961; Kuznets,1966; Barro and Sala-
i-Martin,1995) can raise the efficiency and the labor productivity of adults and children.
Hence unexpectable exogenous improvements in health infrastructure, in the local food
industries can increase the efficiency of human capital B and as a consequence the law
motion of human capital. All of these exogenous shocks have positive results in economic
growth and solve the poverty. Equation 31 illustrates the raise in B which should be such
that the poor country can escape the poverty trap.
B >
h1
[h1φ− γ(1− q)]θ1qθ2h1−θ1−θ21 [σ + θ1]θ1
(28)
Figure 6: Increasing Bt
Figure 6 illustrates the increase of B that leads the law motion of human capital to move
upwards. The above aids can be the big push and solve the poverty of developing countries.
5 Computational Experiment
In this section, we examine the quantitative implications of the benchmark and the exten-
sions of our model. We calibrate it with values of the existing literature.
The weight β of children in the utility function governs the growth rate of population
in the balanced growth path. This parameter is set to β = 0.216 like Fernadez -Villaverde
and Kruger (2004). A similar value is imposed in Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2010). We
impose that the technological level of human capital B is set to 1 for simplicity.
The time cost parameter φ for having children defines the overall opportunity cost of
having children.Like de la Croix and Doepke(2003), we set φ = 0.075 even if they do not
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have child labor in their model. The authors use evidence from Robert Haveman and Wolfe
(1995) and Knowles (1999) which suggests that the opportunity cost of a child is equal to 15
percent of the parents’time endownment. This cost only accumulates as long as the child is
living with the parents. To impose this value they refer that if they assume that children live
with parents for 15 years and that the adult period lasts for 30 years, the overall time cost
should be 50 percent of time cost per year with the child present. Moreover, this parameter
φ also sets an upper limit on the number of children a person can have. With their choice,
a person spending all the time raising a children would have a little above 13 children.
The productivity of children is set to γ= 0.0006 12. This is an arbitrary value and in the
section of sensitivity analysis we investigate its behavior. We trigger this variable too low
in the fact that child labor laws restricts the use of child labor (Doepke, 2004) and also, we
need φ >γ to ensure positivity of our optimal choices.The intuition theoretically is that the
parents’s cost is higher than the lack of experience of children otherwise the children should
live without the parental presence. Furthermore, we assume that having one sector model
with homogenous agents the productivity of children remains the same and it can not be
influenced by their human capital.
Furthermore, the elasticity of survival probability, σ, is set to 0.1. It is an arbitrary
value that leads us to the implementation of sensitivity analysis of this parameter in our
numerical example. In particular, we find that an increase in σ leads to an increase in the
level of nutrition that parents offer to their children. Also, there is an increase in the length
of schooling and consequently to human capital.
Concerning the value of time in primary school, q, is set equal to 0.1 which respects
assumption 4.
Now, we need to discuss all the process of the estimation of elasticities of human capital
accumulation. Before we start this analysis, we estimate the elasticities of human capital for
countries under the stage of development in order to calibrate the theoretical framework13
and investigate mainly its dynamics.As econometric technique, we use the constraint OLS
regression since we need the sum of elasticities to be equal to one. in our regression, we use
a sample of developing countries. First of all, taking the logarithms in the Equation 5 that
we can rewrite the law motion of human capital as:
ln(ht+1) = θ1 ln(mt) + θ2 ln(et + q) + (1− θ1 − θ2) ln(ht) + (t. (29)
All the empirical literature (see for instance Becker,1974; Lee,1995) uses that as proxy of
human capital we need to use enrollment rates at school. In our case this is not possible
12In numerical example for regime 2, we consider that γ=0.006. We supposed this value for this regime for
two reasons. First, it is arbitrary value and second because the above value is too small and inversely related
to education by imposing it we arrive to the high steady state without aids since the second equilibrium is
unstable.Consequently, in our case we want to show the influence of the different foreign aids we suppose
that γ=0.0006. If we use this value in the regime 1 then across the generations parents stop to feed their
children and the nutrition status is based on only on foreign aid, specially for school feeding program
13According to the literature (Azariadis et al 2004 ; Quan ,1993,1996) persistent poverty can be explain
from the poverty traps. But persistent poverty and emergent bimodality can be used as proof that poverty
traps explain the data.In our paper, we do not try to investigate empirically the existence of poverty trap.
Having lackness of data, we try to estimate the coefficients of law motion of human capital for homogenous
sample(developing countries) which remain constant according to the assumptions of our model.The reason
which we realize this regression is to calibrate the model and for the robustness of our results we provide a
sensitivity analysis with numbers given by the existence literature.
23
because the law motion of human capital depends on education, nutrition and parental
human capital. Consequently, we use the approach of Bils and Klenow (2000) to avoid
problems of endogeneity and correlation between the variables. Their methodology allows
to me to obtain a proxy for the human capital. They construct human capital stock which is
the dependent variable and the enrollment rates of schooling is independent variable in their
regression avoiding endogeneity bias14. This human capital stock consists of the percentage
gains in human capital from each year of education and experience respectively. More
precise, they construct human capital stocks from 1960 to 1990 by country as follows. They
first construct an estimate of human capital for workers at each age from 25 to 59 for both
1960 and 1990 incorporating schooling,experience and teacher’s human capital specific to
each age. Then,using population weights by age, they weight the age-specific human capitals
into aggregates for 25 to 59 years old. Their measure of human capital for an individual
is based on the Mincerian model of human capital accumation generalized for an impact
from human capital of the previous generation. It also allows for the experience to have
a quadratic form in their model. Returns to experience and experience-squared are chosen
such that they experience-earnings profiles mimic the average profile of the sample of Mincer
estimates.
They calculate the educational attainment because an individual’s human capital is a
function of the human capital in past cohorts.15 Their analysis is based on surveys compiled
by the United Nations and reported in the two UNESCO publications Statistics of Edu-
cational Attainment and illiteracy 1945-1974 and Statistics of Educational and illeteracy
1970-1980 and Penn Word tables.
As we mention above, their technique allows them to regress human capital stocks with
schooling without problems of endogeneity and correlation. We follow their methodology
and use the Penn World tables, the above UNESCO publications and the mincer earnings
estimations as given in the appendix of their paper to obtain the human capital stocks for
1960 and 1990 that consist two different generations for our model since each generation is
approximated around 30 years. Thus we consider that lnh60 = lnhtand lnh90 = ht+1 in
our model.In our data set there are 66 developing countries. Lack of data leads us to use
only developing countries in our sample. We realize this regression only to use the estimates
of the coefficients to calibrate our model. Later , we provide a sensitivity analysis to them.
For the level of length of schooling, we used data from the Barro-Lee data set and World
bank database.
For nutrition, we use the approach of Arcand ( 2001) and Six World Food Survey of
the Food Agricuture organization who use as proxy the Prevalence of food inadequacy16
(PFI)17. We use data from F.A.O (Food and Agriculture organisation of the United nations).
Assuming that the error term is log normal multipliticative, the results of our constraint
OLS regression are :
14Since the human capital depends only on the percentage gains in human capital from each year of
education and experience respectively is independent on the enrollment rates. Thus, we can regress this
human capital stock with the enrollment rates.
15For more details, see Bils and Klenow(2000)
16PFI is a measure which involves comparison of household food consumption with a minimum dietary
energy requirement and classification of individuals in households with per capital calorie consumption levels
below the minimum requirement as being in the undernourished category.
17Arcand used several variables as a proxy for the nutrition like Prevelance of food inadequacy and Dietary
Energy Supply(DES). He refers that there is a measurement error for Dietary Energy supply (DES) that are
constructed by FAO. Hence, we prefer to use Prevalence of food inadequacy.
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Table 1
(1)
VARIABLES in90
ih60 0.53***
(0.000)
education 0.25***
(0.03)
nutrition 0.20***
(0.04)
Observations 66
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1 presents the results of our constraint regression18. We used constraint regression as
method of estimation since we need to keep the sum of elasticities of human capital equal
to one. First of all, we need to mention that our sample is small because we do not have
availability for more data using the technique of Bils and Klenow(2000). We controlled
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.19Also, we observe that all the variables are
significant at 5%. This is in line with Bils and Klenow (2000), Arcand (2001) and Wang et
al (2003). Specially, the latter studies show that nutrition status is significant in the long
run and hence it has an impact on the growth rate of real GDP per capita. Furthermore, as
it concerns the returns of human capital of education, Abdus and Rangazas (2010) impose
as a value 0.304. Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder and Weil (2000) use the same approach as Bils and
Klenow(2000) and impose the value of 0.32. Consequently, our coefficient for education is
closed to the literature. Table 2 summarizes the values of the parameters:
Table 2: Parameters Values
θ1 0.2 θ2 0.25
σ 0.1 γ 0.0006
φ 0.075 β 0.216
Now, it is assumed that the parameters are set at their baseline. We compute the effects
on child nutrition, length of schooling, level of human capital and fertility.The first of our
analysis concerns the values of foreign aids that allow a developing country to escape from
the poverty trap. The second part focus on a simulation in which the intergenerational
effects of the foreign food aids, in particular the feeding programs and the subsidy in prices
of nutrition, are compared to the evolution of the system in absence of these aids. The
simulation exercise is done under to different production functions. Firstly, we use Yt = Ht
as in the theoretical section and secondly, Yt = Hαt , where α we impose the value α=0.3320.
18Our regression takes into account the assumptions of the theoretical model to ensure the positivity of
the coefficients i.e Assumption 1.
19We used the command robust in STATA to control for heteroskedasticity.
20Now the wages are not constant anymore, consequently the intervals of regimes are not constant since
the succeed regimes are moving over time and we can not analytically characterize them.
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5.1 Values that allows escaping from poverty trap
The results of the values of aid in which the country escapes from the poverty trap are
summarized in table 3.
Insert Table 3
The ηt is equal to 0.96. That it means that the organizations like WFP should provide the
96% of the nutrition that parents buy for their children. At this percent the country can
escape of the poverty trap. This value can be characterize to much high consequently it is
obvious that it is difficult the poverty to be solved in developing countries by this foreign
aid.Also, since the productivity of human capital,B, is equal to 1, it would need an increase
of 100% in this value. Thereby, investing the local food industries such that the quality of
food increase or investing in the agricultural sector by subsidizing local farmers it would
lead this economy out of poverty only if it is sufficient high. This is in line with studies
like Harris (2003) and Smedley and Kinniburg (2001) which refer that the investments for
infrastructure and the support for the local industries should be high enough for developing
countries if we want to achieve their economic development.
At the end,in the above table, we present the value of fixed commodity that it is provided
as a meal in school or offered at home at which parents decide stopping to feed their children
at home and also to send the country out of the deprivation. It is equal to T=0.0032 and
m¯=0.0006921.
5.2 Computational experiment
In tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 we present the first and second regime under two different production
functions, the linear one and the diminishing returns to scale.In particular, we compare the
level of nutrition and human capital, fertility and also the length of schooling before and
after the implication of school feeding programs or subsidizing the nutrition’s prices. The
values for the total nutrition represents amount of commodity. The education is the time
spent from secondary school to university and the fertility is the number of children.
Insert Table 4
Insert Table 5
Insert Table 6
Insert Table 7
Model predictions have been computed for a period of three generations (120 years, each
generation is 30 years). We provide this computational experiment to investigate the effects
of the implication of the two different aids in the two regimes. We also investigate if our
theoretical results are robust under different production functions, the linear and the dimin-
ishing returns22. The results are similar for both of production functions. This is consistent
with studies like Hansen and Tarp (2001), Economides et al (2008) and Daalgard et al(2004)
which show that the aggregate aid impacts on growth either positively or negatively remains
unchanged with or without diminish returns.
In tables 4 and 6, we observe that the school feeding programs increase the length of
schooling and as a result there is an improvement of human capital. It is important to
mention that we concluded that in the theoretical part that the total nutrition remains the
21The maximum T and m¯ are units of commodities.
22Now the wage is not constant and it depends on the population. There are not analytical solutions
incorporating this production function.Thus the calibration is necessary in this case.
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same ((Jacoby et al, 1996; Powell et al, 1983; Murphy et al,2003 and Agarwai et al, 1989)
but through the intergenerational transmission of human capital we observe that there is an
increase of it after two generations (see tables 4 and 6 generation 3). This is a line with the
empirical evidence(Simon,1998).
On the contrary, tables 5 and 7 show that low levels of commodity T trickle down not
only the total nutrition but also the human capital. As a consequence, the total economy
of the developing country is locked in the poverty trap. In particular, we can observe that
there is the quantity and quality trade off. Parents decreases the nutrition levels that offer to
their children, the total nutrition decreases and at the meantime they increase the number
of their children. Since there is decrease in the human capital, the negative consequences
become even worse across the generations for the poor developing countries.
Furthermore, if WFP subsidizes the nutrition’s prices, we observe that the total level of
nutrition increases. Here the intuition is simple.Having the same income parents can offer
higher levels of nutrition to their children and hence their human capital increases in both
regimes.
It is noteworthy to refer that both foreign aids underline the reduction of child labor.
Child labor is a social undesirable phenomenon in all the developing countries23. Thus,
we can conclude that these two foreign food aids not only solve the short term hunger and
improve the human capital but also they increase the length of schooling either direct (school
feeding programs) or indirect (subsidizing nutrition’s prices) specially in the middle income
developing countries.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
In this last subsection, we provide a sensitivity analysis for our parameters. All the above ta-
bles illustrates the baseline parameters used for our numerical example. Now, we present the
different effects of parameters variations on our main variables, namely nutrition resources,
levels of length of schooling and human capital.
Insert Table 8
Insert Table 9
Firstly, we consider the parameter θ1 which represents the return to nutrition and includes
the direct effects of nourishing on human capital. Thereby decreasing the returns, we note
that the amount of resources dedicated to child nutrition is decreasing. On the contrary,
the human capital and the length of schooling increase. Opposite results are obtained by
the variation of the return to schooling, θ2.
One other important parameter is γ since it is the earning that the children obtain in the
work (when the production function is Yt = Ht). This parameter has inverse relationship
with the length of schooling and as we observe the higher it is then much more prevents the
children to attend school. On the other hand, it increases the nutrition resources since there
is more income in the families and also the human capital.
Another, parameter is the elasticity of survival probability, σ. We observe that by increas-
ing σ there is an increase in the level of nutrition resources, human capital and education.
This means that as the elasticity of survival probability decreases the parents spend more
for the nutrition of their children to keep the alive. (Boucekkine and Laffargue(2010) have
23According to UNICEF, there are an estimated 158 million children aged 5 to 14 in child labour worldwide,
excluding child domestic labour
27
the same approach in their model24). We do not provide sensitivity analysis for the param-
eters β and φ since these two parameters are straightforward having effects in fertility. In
particular the effects of an increased time-cost of bringing up a child, φ leads in a reduction
of fertility but it increases education and nutrition resources and thus the human capital.
6 Conclusions
Our aim in this paper has been to evaluate the efficiency of the different foreign food aid
policies as provided from WFP in the developing countries.
We develop a two-period OLG model in which agents choose their present consumption,
the number of their children, the length of schooling and the amount of resources dedicated
to nutrition for each for their children. It is assumed that children share the unit of their
available time between work and education in accordance with the decision parents make.
Following the literature, our human capital accumulation is consisted by the nutrition, edu-
cation and parental human capital. Thus, our framework captures the complementarity of
child nutrition and child learning capacity (see Curais et al, 2010). It can be shown that
our benchmark model emerges multiple equilibria and may explain the existence of poverty
traps.In particular, It shows that countries with low human capital find themselves to be
trapped in conditions of low nutrition, high levels of child labor and high fertility rates.
We extend our model by implement four different foreign aids policies provided mainly
from WFP. First of all, we suppose that WFP provides school meals in developing countries
. School meals provide an enhancement in the nutrition status and as consequence in our
model they improve the human capital accumulation and the survival rate of children.
First, we find that school meals lock the poor developing countries in the poverty.In
particular, this aid increases the fertility because the cost of having children decreases. Thus
parents invest less in nutrition of their children, leading to a slowndown the human capital
accumulation. Then the recipient economy is locked into a poverty trap. Nevertheless, if
WFP decides to provide a high amount of food in schools, parents decide to stop feed their
children at home. The total nutrition depends only on the school meals.The developing
country can escape from the poverty trap. Moreover, school feeding programs are really
efficient for the middle-income developing countries. More precisely, they increase the length
of schooling and improve the human capital for future generations even if the total nutrition
remains unchanged (Jacoby et al,1996; Powell et al,1983; Murphy et al,2003 and Agarwai et
al,1989). Consequently, middle-income countries can achieve their economic development.
We introduce as foreign aid program the fact that WFP subsidize the prices of food
for households. This program can be characterized really efficient for high level of subsidy
as it will be shown in the calibration of the model. It allows the poor countries to escape
from the poverty because there is an income effect. Now, parents are affordable to offer
more nutrition resources than before. The total nutrition rises and therefore the survival
probability of children and their human capital.
Moreover, when we consider that WFP offers a constant level of nutrition on households.
We find that this foreign aid policy is not effective.Poor countries and also middle income
countries tickle down to poverty trap. This foreign aid increases the fertility because the
quantity cost of children falls. As a result, parents decreases not only the nutrition level but
also the length of schooling of their children.
24In contrast to our framework they consider that when there is a mortality shock and survival probability
of adults decrease there will be an increase in their health investment.
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Finally, we consider that WFP improves the infrastructure of local food industries or
supports financially the local farmers such that to increase the quality of food and to im-
prove the agricultural productivity. This improvement is captured in our framework by the
technological level of our law of motion of human capital. Consequently, an increase in
the technological level raises the human capital of future generations and hence the poor
economies can achieve the economic development.
Finally, we provide a computational experiment where we show that our theoretical
results are robust under different production functions. Also, we find that introducing school
feeding programs generates an indirect increase of total nutrition across the generations in
the middle income developing countries.
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Appendices
A Proof of Optimal Choices
To prove that the optimal choice of nutrition is an increasing function across the different
regimes, we compare the maximum of each regime with the minimum of the next regime.
In particular, we compare the nutrition of the first regime and the nutrition of the second
plugging h1 in both values.
(σ+θ1)
(
qγ(1−θ1−θ2−σ)
θ2
+γq
)
1−σ−θ1 <
(σ+θ1)
(
qγ(1−θ1−θ2−σ)
θ2
)
1−σ−θ1−θ2
Thus, we have that (−θ1−θ2−σ)qγ(1−σ−θ1) <
qγ(1−θ2−θ1−σ)
(1−σ−θ1−θ2
(1− θ1 − θ2 − σ)(−θ1 − θ2 − σ)qγ < qγ(1− θ1 − θ2 − σ)(1− θ1 − σ)
(−θ2)(1− θ1 − θ2 − σ)qγ < qγ(1− θ1 − θ2 − σ)
0 < 1 + θ2 which is valid.
We continue that the comparison of the value of nutrition of the second regime with that
of third.
(σ+θ1)
(
γ(1−θ1−σ)
θ2
−γ
)
1−σ−θ1−θ2 <
(σ+θ1)
(
γ(1−θ1−σ)
θ2
)
1−σ−θ1
γ(−θ1−σ)
θ2(1−σ−θ1−θ2) <
γ(1−θ1−σ)
θ2(1−σ−θ1)
0 < 1− θ2 which is valid since θ2 is between zero and one. Now, we compare the levels
of fertility across the different regimes. We can see that the fertility is decreasing with htif
we take the derivative with respect to ht.
∂nt
∂ht
= −γ(1−q)(1+β)2(htφ−γ(1−q) < 0
Since all the parameters are positive, the fertlity decreases as long as ht increases.
B Steady States
We denote by hss1the steady state equilibrium in the interval ( γφ , h1].
hss1 =
(hss1φ− γ)θ1(σ + θ1)θ1h1−θ1−θ2ss1
(1− θ1 − σ)θ1 . (A.1)
On the interval (h1, h2] , the steady state equilibrium is the following:
hss2 =
θ
θ2
θ1+θ2
2 (σ + θ1)
θ1
θ1+θ2 γ
θ
θ2
θ1+θ2
2 (σ + θ1)
θ1
θ1+θ2 φ− (1− θ1 − θ2 − σ)γ
θ2
θ1+θ2
. (A.2)
Finally for the interval [h2,∞) the expression of equlilibrium is
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hss3 =
(σ + θ1)
θ1
θ2 φ θ1θ2
(1− θ1 − σ)
θ1
θ2
(A.3)
C Proof of Proposition 1
1. To prove the existence of a unique steady state which locally stable, we define two
functions. The first function is the 45o line, f(ht) = ht( see Figure 1) and the second
is which the first regime of the equation 11, g(ht) =
(σ+θ1)
θ1 (htφ−γ(1−q))θ1h1−θ1−θ2t qθ2
(1−θ1−σ)θ1 .
To prove the existence we need to prove that functions f and g cross once. Thus, we
need to show that f(h) < g(h) for h = γφ which exists because of the Assumption 2,
and also that f(h1) > g(h1) which exists because of the Assumption 4. If g function
is concave, then the steady state previously is locally stable and hence a poverty trap.
Now we need to prove that the g(ht) =
(σ+θ1)
θ1 (htφ−γ(1−q))θ1h1−θ1−θ2t qθ2
(1−θ1−σ)θ1 is concave
function. First i define as k = σ+θ
θ1
1 q
θ2
(1−σ−θ1)θ1 .The first derivative is
∂g
∂ht
= kθ1[htφ− γ(1−
q)]θ1−1h1−θ1−θ2t φ+ k(1− θ1 − θ2)[htφ− γ(1− q)]θ1h−θ1−θ2t . It is positive. The second
derivative is
∂2g
∂2ht
= kθ1(θ1 − 1)[htφ − γ(1 − q)]θ1−2φ2h1−θ1−θ2t + 2kθ1(1 − θ1 − θ2)[htφ − γ(1 −
q)]θ−1h−θ1−θ2t φ+ k(1− θ1 − θ2)(−θ1 − θ2)[htφ− γ(1− q)]θ1 ]h−θ1−θ2−1t =
k[htφ− γ(1− q)]θ1−2h−θ1−θ2−1t [h2tφ2θ1(θ1 − 1) + 2θ1(1− θ1 − θ2)φ[htφ− γ(1− q)]ht +
(1− θ1 − θ2)(−θ1 − θ2)[htφ− γ(1− q)]2
The first part is positive, the second part is negative because the discriminant of
quadratic polynomial is negative.Consequently, the second derivative is less than zero.
As a result, there exists a unique steady state and it is locally stable. Next, we
investigate the equilibrium in the interval (h1, h2]. The equilibrium in this interval
is hss2 =
θ
θ2
θ1+θ2
2 (σ+θ1)
θ1
θ1+θ2 γ
θ
θ2
θ1+θ2
2 (σ+θ1)
θ1
θ1+θ2 φ−(1−θ1−θ2−σ)γ
θ2
θ1+θ2
and also the humal accumulation is
equal ht+1 =
(σ+θ1)
θ1 [htφ−γ]θ1+θ2θθ22 h1−θ1−θ2t
(1−θ1−θ2−σ)θ1+θ2γθ2 . Let us denote as A =
(σ+θ1)
θ1θ
θ2
2
(1−θ1−θ2−σ)θ1+θ2γθ2
and we take the first derivative of the law motion of human capital accumulation for
this interval. The
∂ht+1
∂ht
= A(θ1 + θ2)[htφ− γ]θ1+θ2−1φh1−θ1−θ2t + (1− θ1 − θ2)h−(θ1+θ2)t A[htφ− γ]θ1+θ2
when we plug the steady state in the above derivative we have ∂ht+1∂ht |hss2 > 1 then
hss2 is unstable.This case is represented by the figure 2.
2. To prove stability of the steady state in the interval [h2,∞). Thus, we take the first
derivative of the function ht+1 in the interval [h2,∞) is ∂ht+1∂ht = (1−θ2)h−θ2t
(σ+θ1)
θ1φθ1
(1−θ1−σ)θ1 .
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The steady state is hss3 =
(
(σ+θ1)φ
(1−θ1−σ)
) θ1
θ2 . Substituting for the steady state in the
derivative above we find that ∂ht+1∂ht = (1− θ2) > 0 since 0 < θ2 < 1 and also
∂ht+1
∂ht
|hss3 < 1. This proves that the steady state hss3 is locally stable.
D Proof of Proposition 2
We derive human capital thresholds with respect to T .
∂h1
∂T =
−2q(1−θ1−θ2−σ)
θ2φ
< 0
∂h2
∂T =
−2(1−θ1−θ2−σ)
θ2φ
< 0
Since both are negative, our proposition is proven.
E Proof of Proposition 4
The nutrition for the low regime is equal to mt = (σ+θ1)[htφ−γ(1−q)−Tq)(1−σ−θ1) We want T = mt,
that it means that parents stop to offer food at home. We know that the threshold depends
on T and it is equal to h1(T ) = q(1−θ1−θ2−σ)(γ−T )+θ2γθ2φ .We plug the h1 and we solve for T
and we have that T= (σ+θ1)(1−θ1−σ)γ)(1−θ1−θ2−σ)(σ+θ1)+θ2 .Also, for values of T higher than the above level
mt can not be negative, thus the nutrition of the children is higher than before and human
capital accumulation depends on the foreign aid, ht+1 = (T (q))θ1+θ2h1−θ1−θ2t .
F Proof of Proposition 7
We need the ht+1 function to be higher than the regime h1 to escape from poverty trap.
Thus, we have the following: (σ+θ1)
θ1 [h1φ−γ(1−q)]θ1
(1−σ−θ1)θ1 (1−ηt)θ1 q
θ2h1−θ1−θ21 > h1
(σ+θ1)
θ1 [h1φ−γ(1−q)]θ1
(1−σ−θ1)θ1h1 q
θ2h1−θ1−θ21 > (1− ηt)θ1
(σ+θ1)
θ1 [h1φ−γ(1−q)]θ1
(1−σ−θ1)θ1 q
θ2h−θ1−θ21 > (1− ηt)θ1
(σ+θ1)[h1φ−γ(1−q)]
(1−σ−θ1) q
θ2
θ1 h
−(θ1+θ2)
θ1
1 > (1− ηt)
1− (σ+θ1)[h1φ−γ(1−q)](1−σ−θ1) q
θ2
θ1 h
−(θ1+θ2)
θ1
1 < ηt
The latter defines our proposition.
G Proof of Proposition 9
The nutrition for the low regime is equal to (σ+θ1)(htφ−wtγ(1−q)−[σ+θ1]m¯1−σ−θ1 . For m¯=mt that it
means that the nutrition offered from parents is equal to zero. We know that the threshold
depends on T and it is equal to h1(m¯) = (q(1−θ1−θ2−σ)+θ2)γ+θ2m¯θ2φ . We plug the h1 and we
solve for m¯ and we have that m¯= (σ+θ1)γθ2 . Also, for values of m¯ higher than the above level
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mt can not be negative, thus the nutrition of the children is higher than before and human
capital accumulation depends on the foreign aid, ht+1 = (m¯)θ1+θ2h1−θ1−θ2t .
H Tables
Table 3
Values Escaping Poverty Trap
ηt 0.96
T 0.0032
B 2
m¯ 0.00069
Table 4: Linear Production function (Regime 2)
Generations Nutrition Human Capital Education fertility
Without Aid
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1 2
Generation 2 0.0053 0.1829 0.66 1.8230
Generation 3 0.0026 0.1303 0.27 3.79
Feeding Programmes with T=0.00009
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1 2
Generation 2 0.0053 0.1820 0.67 1.8229
Generation 3 0.0027 0.131 0.20 3.75
Offer food in households with η=0.8
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1 2
Generation 2 0.0263 0.183 0.66 1.82
Generation 3 0.0255 0.1797 0.63 1.91
Table 5 : Linear Production Function (Regime 1)
Generations Nutrition Human Capital Education Fertility
Without Aid
Generation 1 0.12 0.1 Basic 2
Generation 2 0.0030 0.1 Basic 1.7865
Generation 3 0.0014 0.05 Basic 1.9398
Feeding Programmes
Generation 1 0.12 0.1 Basic 2
Generation 2 0.0029 0.09 Basic 1.788
Generation 3 0.0013 0.04 Basic 1.94
Offer food in households
Generation 1 0.12 0.1 Basic 2
Generation 2 0.0149 0.11 Basic 1.7864
Generation 3 0.0098 0.07 Basic 1.8531
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Table 6:Decreasing returns to scale (Regime 2)
Generations Nutrition Human Capital Education fertility
Without Aid
Generation 1 0.18 0.18 0.002 1
Generation 2 0.0044 0.1696 0.6386 2.3982
Generation 3 0.0076 0.2257 0.5621 1.9632
Feeding Programmes
Generation 1 0.18 0.18 0.002 1
Generation 2 0.0044 0.17 0.65 2.39
Generation 3 0.0077 0.2266 0.57 1.95
Offer food in households
Generation 1 0.18 0.18 0.002 1
Generation 2 0.0219 0.17 0.63 2.3982
Generation 3 0.0398 0.2328 0.56 1.93
Table 7:Decreasing returns to scale(Regime 1)
Generations Nutrition Human Capital Education Fertility
Without Aid
Generation 1 0.13 0.13 Basic 2
Generation 2 0.0002 0.1214 Basic 1.76
Generation 3 0.0001 0.0284 Basic 2.21
Feeding Programmes
Generation 1 0.13 0.13 Basic 1
Generation 2 0.00019 0.1213 Basic 1.77
Generation 3 0.00001 0.0282 Basic 2.29
Offer food in households
Generation 1 0.13 0.13 Basic 2
Generation 2 0.0088 0.1214 Basic 1.76
Generation 3 0.0030 0.07 Basic 1.85
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Table 8 : Sensitivity Analysis
Generations
Generations Nutrition Human capital Education
Without Aid
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.0053 0.1829 0.66
Generation 3 0.0026 0.1303 0.27
γ=0.003
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.0365 0.1829 1
Generation 3 0.0538 0.2503 1
σ=0.1
Without Aid
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.0053 0.1829 0.66
Generation 3 0.0026 0.1303 0.27
σ=0.2
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.091 0.1829 0.8836
Generation 3 0.0066 0.1554 0.62
Table 9 : Sensitivity analysis of returns of human Capital
Generations
Generations Nutrition Human capital Education
Returns of Nutrition:0.2
Without Aid
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.0053 0.1829 0.66
Generation 3 0.0026 0.1303 0.27
Returns of Nutrition:0.07
Generation 1 0.17 0.18 0.1
Generation 2 0.0023 0.1843 0.69
Generation 3 0.0023 0.13 0.49
39
Countries of the sample.
Countries
Algeria Togo Peru
Benin Tunisia Uruguay
Botswana Uganda Venezuela
Cameroon Zaire China
Central Africa Zambia Hong Kong
Egypt Zimbabwe India
Gambia Costa Rica Indonesia
Ghana Dominican R Iran
Kenya Guatemala Iraq
Lesotho Haiti Korea
Malawi Honduras Kuwait
Mali Jamaica Malaysia
Mauritania Mexico Pakistan
Morocco Nicaragua Saudi Arabia
Mozambique Panama Singapore
Niger Trinidad and Tobago Sri Lanka
Nigeria Argentina Taiwan
Rwanda Bolivia Thailand
Senegal Brazil Turkey
Sierra Leone Chile Papua New Guinea
Sudan Colombia Tanzania
Swaziland Ecuador Paraguay
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